

“The impact of the new election code on local elections in Ukraine”

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Introduction

In July 2020, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (parliament) amended a **new election code** which was passed earlier in December of the same year.

According to numerous expert opinions¹, the most impressive changes in the new code were:

- **The new ballot** on which voters can vote for both a party and for an individual candidate of the party.
- The new **open-list proportional system** for councils representing more than 10,000 voters*.
- Increased **party control**, since a deputy now can be recalled by the party.
- Increased **participation of women**, internally displaced persons (IDPs), economic migrants, and persons with disabilities.

*Is the new system really “open-list”?



According to Boiko (January 2020; December 2020), the correct title for this system is “*flexible-list proportional representation system*”. The final outcome depends greatly on the exact position of a candidate in the list. This position is decided by parties in the first place.

Petro Bodnar from the analytical platform Texty.org.ua provides empirical evidence to support this idea:

https://texty.org.ua/articles/102361/lyshe-22-deputaty-kyvivrady-zi-120-projshly-zavdyaky-vidkryty-m-spyskam/?src=read_next&from=102405

Although the new code proposed many significant changes, this report is focused on **gender quota for local council elections**. The new election code introduced the **40% gender quota** for local elections for councils representing more than 10,000 voters**.

***Unless otherwise stated, this report uses “councils” and “councils representing more than 10,000 voters” interchangeably.*

On the one hand, many experts positively evaluated this quota (Alekankina 2020; NDI, September 2020; Opora 2020). According to some evaluations, the share of registered female candidates for local elections increased from 35% in 2015 to 45% in 2020. On the other hand, a number of concerns were raised regarding the implementation of this new norm. According to NDI (October 2020), some parties had difficulties recruiting women to meet the quota. Moreover, experts received information that some parties circumvented the quota by signing up women and then asking them to withdraw (ibid, Alekankina 2020). In addition to this, women were more likely to have additional challenges since local party representatives often carry costs of a campaign (which was more difficult for women) and sexism (ibid).

Why do we need this report now?

Most of the existing reports and analyses were produced before the elections. This current report will evaluate the outcomes of elections and address the concerns of the experts regarding the gender quota.

¹ See Alekankina 2020; Boiko, December 2020; IFES 2020; Opora 2020; NDI, September 2020; NDI, October 2020.

Summary of main empirical findings



The dataset includes

1. biographies of 229,272 candidates from 154 parties in 1,558 councils.
2. 1,958 political programs of 6 major parties.
3. 6 in-depth interviews with female politicians.

The bulk of the research is focused on 786 councils with at least 10,000 voters.



45% of all registered candidates were women. This trend was observed in all types of councils and among all parties. Considering winners, from 25% to 35% of winners among all top largest parties in all councils were female politicians. Considering oblast level councils, shares of female winners increased significantly (sometimes twofold) compared to local elections of 2015.



At the same time, the data show multiple issues with violations of gender quota.

1. Half of all parties that competed in large councils (more than 10,000 voters) violated the first rule of gender quota (i.e., to have 2 or 3 women in every five candidates on the list).
2. Two-thirds of all parties that competed in large councils (more than 10,000 voters) violated the second rule of gender quota (i.e., to have a strict order of males and females in the tails of their lists).
3. 70% of all parties that competed in small councils (fewer than 10,000 voters) violated the rule of having no less than 30% of females in their list.



Party and regional analysis indicates that these violations were more likely to happen in the largest Oblast level councils where (1) large and resourceful parties compete, (2) lists of parties are large and the cost of monitoring is higher. Moreover, the largest parties violated gender quota in different regions, which indicates that local resources and influence played a significant role.



Considering major legislative channels of gender inequality in Ukrainian politics, it seems that the rule of having “the first candidate” contributes to gender disbalance in party leadership greatly.

Moreover, violations at the level of the single list are quite harmful since (1) the position of a candidate in this list (which determined by party) shapes their chances get into the councils; (2) at the same time, this list is concealed (e.g., less discussed than the territorial list) since it is not printed on ballots.

Considering structural channels of gender inequality in politics, our interviews and statistical data of biographies indicate that female politicians in Ukraine still have many challenges in competing with male politicians due to the lack of resources and economic burdens which stem from socio-economic inequalities in society.

Gender quota

According to the electoral code of Ukraine², article 219, paragraph 9 states that:

- Both single and territorial party lists should include **at least two men and two women among every five candidates** (places from the first to the fifth, from the sixth to the tenths, and so on).
- In case the number of candidates is not multiple of five, then it is necessary to include men and women one by one:
 - male-female-male-female and so on.
 - female-male-female-male and so on.
- In case of councils with fewer than 10,000 voters, each party should include at least 30% of women in a list of candidates.

What does “single and territorial party lists” mean? There are two party lists for local elections: “single electoral” list and “territorial list”.


- First, parties create a single electoral list for the corresponding council. The number of candidates should not exceed the number of members at the corresponding council.
- Then, parties divide this list into territorial lists according to territorial districts of a particular local council (the number of districts depends on the number of seats).
- A candidate from a single list may be included in only one territorial list.
- The “first candidate” from the single list automatically receives a seat in case their party wins. The “first candidates” are often presented as party leaders. They do not compete with other party members for the position on the list. By law, they have to be mentioned together with the party name on each ballot.

Allocation of candidates. From a single list to territorial lists

² <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/396-20#Text>

Single list for a council
(N=size of a council)

Territorial list for a council
(from 5 to 12 surnames)



Methodology.

This report employs data from the Central Electoral Committee website in order to assess whether:

1. Did parties comply? **Analysis for all parties and all types of councils:**
 - For councils with 10,000 voters and more
 - **Violation 1.** Is it true that each five candidates in both single and territorial districts have 2 or 3 women?
 - **Violation 2.** In case the number of candidates is not multiple of five, is it true that the order of candidates (in both single and territorial districts) is m-f-m-f-... or f-m-f-m-...
 - For councils with fewer than 10,000 voters
 - Is it true that at least 30% of candidates are women?
2. Have more women been elected?
 - For large councils (oblast level), whether the percentage of female winners increased when compared to local elections in 2015.
3. In addition to this, a series of in-depth interviews with female candidates were conducted to get more insight in the challenges and obstacles experienced by women in politics in Ukraine.

What this report is **not** about?



This report does not employ any polling data. Therefore, it does not provide any evidence on motivation of voters (i.e., whether they evaluate candidates based on their gender).

Instead, this report provides data about context and structural conditions of the electoral process in Ukraine which might favor or, in the opposite, hinder chances of female politicians.

Data description.

Data from the Central Electoral Committee cover:

Biographies of 229,272 candidates* from 154 parties in 1,558 councils in all regions (*oblasts*) of Ukraine:

- 225,552 candidates from 144 parties and 786 from councils and with 10,000 voters
- 50,384 candidates from 70 parties (also self-nominated candidates) and 772 councils with fewer than 10,000 voters

*it is possible that the same person was a candidate in more than one council. A candidate is allowed to run for no more than 2 councils. Furthermore, a candidate for a mayor in a city with fewer than 75,000 voters was allowed to run for 2 councils (oblast and city levels).

Distribution of councils by their type:

	More than 10,000 voters	Fewer than 10,000 voters
City council	324 (41%)	22 (3%)
Selyshna (town) council	213 (27%)	212 (27%)
Rayon council	134 (17%)	-
Silska (town) council	70 (8%)	538 (70%)
Oblast city center council	23 (3%)	-
Oblast council	22 (3%)	-
Total	786 councils (100%)	772 councils (100%)

Data of qualitative interview include interviews with seven female candidates from Western, Central, Southern, and North Ukraine.

Holos	Candidate
Radycal party	Candidate
Ukrainian Halytian Party	Candidate
Udar	Candidate
Za maibutne (For the Fututre)	Winner
European Solidarity	Winner
Sluha Narodu (Servant of People)	Winner

First glance

At the first glance, data show that candidates and winners were quite balanced in terms of gender. Considering candidates, **45% of all registered candidates were women**. This trend was observed in all types of councils and among all parties. Considering winners, **from 25% to 35% of winners** among all top largest parties in all councils were female politicians.

Table 1.1. Top parties in terms of registered candidates, winners and female winners (councils with more than 10,000 voters)

	Registered	Winners (% of all winners from all parties)	Female Winners (% of respective party winners)
Motherland (<i>Batkivshyna, B</i>)	23,057	2,546 (10.6%)	839 (33.0%)
Servant of the People (<i>Sluha Narodu, SN</i>)	22,945	3,871 (16.0%)	1,364 (35.2%)
For the Future (<i>Za Maibutne, ZM</i>)	21,603	2,266 (9.2%)	732 (33.0%)
European Solidarity (<i>ES</i>)	21,188	3,116 (12.9%)	1,041 (33.4%)
Opposition Platform for Live (<i>OPZH, OP</i>)	17,160	3,207 (13.3%)	1,097 (34.2%)
Our Land (<i>Nash Krai, NK</i>)	12,596	1,030 (4.3%)	344 (33.4%)
Freedom (<i>Svoboda</i>)	9,852	713 (2.9%)	177 (24.8%)
Lyashko Radical Party	9,314	458 (1.9%)	152 (32.3%)

However, as mentioned in the Methodology section, there are different types of possible violations that can be detected in the data. In order to detect these violations, one has to go deeper in the structure of the single and territorial party lists for each council. We address this issue in what follows.

How many parties did not comply?

Large councils (more than 10,000 voters)

Considering large councils (more than 10,000 voters), there were 144 competing parties. Some of them were large and national, competing in almost all councils across Ukraine, while others were small and local parties. The smallest party competed only for one council (e.g., “Patrioty Ukrainy” or “Respublika”). Largest parties competed in more than 700 councils (e.g., “Sluha Narodu” and “Batkivshyna” competed in 762 and 758 councils, respectively).

Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics. Size of parties.

	Mean	Median	Min	Max
Number of registered candidates	1,566	239	20	23,007
Number of councils to compete	54	8	1	756

In this report, we consider two possible violations of gender quota in large councils:

- **Violation 1.** The rule of 2 or 3 women in every five candidates is violated
- **Violation 2.** In case the number of candidates is not multiple of five, the order of m-f-m-f... or f-m-f-m is violated.

Table 2 shows how many parties violated the rules of gender quota at least once. There is a significant number of parties that violated rules at least once.

- Considering types of violation, Violation 2 prevails. While having proper proportions of men and women is relatively easy in every five candidates (from the first to the fifth, from the six to the tenth, etc.), a task to allocate males and females in the “tails” of the list appeared to be quite challenging for many parties.
- Considering types of lists, it was essential to have proper ballots for each territorial district (since they were printed and transparent for everyone to see). At the same time, the pressure to comply in creating the single list was less significant. The data corroborates this logic showing a higher rate of noncompliance in the single list.

Table 2.2. Violation of gender quota at least once by parties.

	Single list	Territorial list
Violation 1	80 (55%)	68 (47%)
Violation 2	95 (66%)	98 (68%)
N of parties	144	144

Compliance by top parties

One has to bear in mind that the abovementioned analysis addressed all parties, including small and local outliers. **All parties that did not comply are presented in Appendix** (Tables A1 and A2 for the single and territorial lists, respectively).

Perhaps, the organizational chaos of local elections under the pressure of ongoing electoral and administrative reform allowed negligence or even corruption. However, to test whether such violations were significant in their scale, we suggest focusing the analysis on the top parties. In what follows, we analyze top-20 parties (by the number of candidates and by the number of councils where they compete).

Figures 1 and 2 describe the ratio of violations to the number of councils where each party competed. For instance, “Holos” competed in 194 councils. We observe “violation 1” in 5 of councils (2,6%) and “violation 2” in 18 of councils (9,3%). At the same time “Ahrarna party” competed in 92 councils. We observe “violation 1” in 19 of them (20,7%) and “violation 2” in 15 of them (16,3%).

As Figure 1 clearly shows, “violations 2” were more likely to happen in the tails of single lists. According to Figure 2, this trend was even more pronounced in territorial lists.

To summarize these findings:

1. In general, violation 2 is more common than violation 1. In simple terms, it is difficult to circumvent the rules in the most visible and transparent parts of the list. At the same time, some violations could be hidden in the tails of long and concealed lists.
2. Violation 1 (i.e., having some errors in a list of each five candidates) is more common in the single list. This is not surprising, given that the single list is not printed.
3. Violation 2 (i.e., having some errors in the tails of the list) is more common in the territorial list.

Figure 1. Top-20 largest parties. Single list. Violations relative to number of councils.





Figure 2. Top-20 largest parties. Territorial list. Violations relative to number of councils.



Regions and types of councils. Top-4 parties.

For this analysis, we select only four largest parties. They all competed in more than 700 councils. The gap between these four top parties and the next one in line is almost 9,000 candidates (Table 3).

Table 3. Size of top parties

	N of candidates	N of councils
VO Baktivshyna (BTK)	23,007	758
Sluha Narodu (SN)	22,852	762
Za Maibutne (ZM)	21,537	741
Evropeiska Solidarnist (ES)	21,130	744
Nash Krai	12,572	427

These parties are selected for the analysis because they have covered all Ukraine competing in all regions and types of councils. Therefore, their data are the most representative. Furthermore, these parties were the largest, and thus, they had more resources and influence to circumvent the law and get away with that from local authorities. Finally, the largest parties are the most visible and influential in the public discourse. Thus, it is important to analyze their activities.

Figures 2 and 3 present shares of lists with *any violation* (1 or 2) by top parties in macro-regions and types of council. The allocation of regions (oblasts) by macro-regions is described in Appendix.

To summarize these findings:

1. Among all top-4 parties, Batkivshyna complied the least.
2. Regardless the region, all top-4 parties were *more likely* to violate gender quota in large oblast level councils and less likely to violate rules in *city councils*.
3. Parties were more likely to violate rules in different regions, which signals about the role of local resources and opportunities.
 - a. Batkivshyna had more violations in Western region
 - b. Servant of People (Sluha Narodu) had more violations in the South
 - c. For the Future (Za Maibutne) in the East
 - d. European Solidarity in the Center and West

Figure 3. Shares of lists with any violation by largest parties relative to those councils where a respective party competed. Region.





Figure 4. Shares of lists with any violation by largest parties relative to those councils where a respective party competed. Council type.




Did female politicians improve their position in Ukraine?

For this analysis we compare only the *oblast* level councils. The data for smaller councils are either not available or not valid for direct comparisons due to administrative reform changes.

In 2015, a gender quota was suggested, however, there was no official enforcement. As Figure 5 shows, the share of female winners increased significantly in all regions (oblast councils). The only exception is the council of Sumska oblast where the shares of female winners were comparatively high already in 2015.

Figure 5. Comparison of female winners in oblast level councils in Ukraine: 2015 and 2020

Oblast radas



Small councils (fewer than 10,000 voters)

Considering small councils, gender quota there worked differently. By law, each party should have 30% of female candidates. There is no requirement about their particular location on a list.

70 parties competed in 772 small councils. Most of these councils administer small towns and villages (*silska and selyshna*). Largest parties competed in hundreds of councils. For instance, Batkivshyna competed in 658 councils, Sluha Narodu (Servant of People) in 601, and Za Maibutne (For the Future) in 589.


Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics. Size of parties.

	Mean	Median	Min	Max
Number of registered candidates	499	44	1	7,293
Number of councils to compete	55	7	1	658

Our data show that out of 70 parties which competed in small councils, **49 parties violated gender quota at least once** (70% of all). This figure is comparable to “Violation 2” in large councils (see Table 2.2 above).

All parties and the number of their violations are listed in Appendix (Table A3). Figure 6 shows the largest parties and their violations relative to the number of councils where they competed. For instance, “Holos” competed in 29 councils and “Sluha Narodu” (Servant of People) competed in 601 councils. These parties violated gender quota in 9 (32%) and 42 (7%) councils.

Figure 6. Share of violations relative to the number of councils where each party competed.



Considering regional and administrative distribution, Tables 5 and 6 show major parties that competed in small councils. Given relatively small size of the sample, Tables 5 and 6 present absolute numbers.

Table 5. Regional distribution of violations. Top parties in small councils

	Center-North	East	South	West
Batkivshyna	8	14	5	28
Nash Krai	10	1	10	3
Sluha Narodu (SP)	9	5	12	16
Za maibutne (FF)	23	2	18	25

Table 6. Administrative distribution of violations. Top parties in small councils

	City council	Selyshna council	Silka councils
Batkivshyna	0	11	44
Nash Krai	0	8	16
Sluha Narodu (SP)	1	9	32
Za maibutne (FF)	2	19	47

To summarize these findings:

1. Among all top-4 parties, “Za Maibutne” complied the least.
2. Regardless of the region, all top-4 parties were *more likely* to violate the gender quota in silka council. Yet “Za Maibutne” and “Batkivshyna” (BTK) also managed to violate the norm in selyshna councils.
3. Parties were more likely to violate rules in different regions, which signals about the role of local resources and opportunities.

- a. Batkivshyna had more violations in Western region (similar to large councils). Moreover, this party managed to violate quota in East.
- b. Sluha Narodu (Servant of People) and Za Maibutne had more violations in the West and South.

Possible mechanisms of gender disbalance in politics in Ukraine

Legislative channels

New gender quota relies on specific nuances of how the lists are organized and how the votes are counted.

A person's position in the territorial list and a position in the single list are important just as votes of people. All these variables influence the chances of candidates to get seats.

Example:

Suppose a council has 120 seats

- Each party has the “first candidate” who automatically receives a seat.
 - a. A winning party must pass the 5% threshold. Suppose there are five winning parties with total support of 500,000 voters.
 - b. First, each “first candidate” of these parties receive their seats. $120 \text{ seats} - 5 = 115$ seats do be distributed across party members.
 - c. How to decide who is going to receive a seat? A price of each seat is calculated as follows: $500,000 \text{ total votes by } 115 \text{ seats} = 4,347 \text{ votes per seat}$. **Thus, a party has to get at least 4,347 in a territorial district to receive a mandate (i.e., to reserve a seat).**
 - d. If a party gets 10,000 votes in territorial district – then they receive two mandates ($4,347 + 4,347$). Then, there is also a “leftover” of 1,306 votes. These votes go to a bundle – they go to a single list.
 - e. Which particular individual receive a seat? The answer is twofold. (1) The first person in the territorial list will get a seat (even if they personally received only a few votes). **Thus, a position in a territorial list matter!** (2) However, this person can be challenged by the next person in the list in case if the latter passed a 25% electoral quota ($4347 * 0.25 = 1,086$). In simple words, if the first person in the list has 10 votes, and the third person has 1,086 – then the third person can challenge the first one and receive a seat. **Thus, votes matter!**
 - f. If a candidate passes the electoral quota of 25% - then this candidate occupies a leading position in the territorial list (e.g., this person moved from any position to the first one). If more than one candidate passes the electoral quota in the same territorial list – then they both are moving up the list, and their order reflects the number of votes. If their votes are equal, then their order is defined by their place in the territorial list.
 - g. As mentioned above, all “votes-leftovers” are then transferred to the single list. If a winning party in total gets less than 4,347 in a territorial district – then all votes from this district are transferred to the single list as well. Then, these votes are distributed within a single list. **Thus, a position in the single list matters.**

Therefore, it is important to investigate the allocation of women in the single list in order to evaluate their chances of success.

“The first candidate” channel

Table 7.1 shows a striking disproportion of the “first candidate” position among male and female candidates. While all other positions are distributed in line with the gender quota, (52%-59% males and 41%-48% females), the most valuable position was secured primarily by men (78% male and 22% female candidates). As Table 7.2. shows, this pattern was the same for all types of councils

Table 7.1. Distribution of the places in the single list

	% are men	% are women
First candidate	78.0	22.0

Table 7.2. Distribution of the places in the territorial party list (only “first candidates”)

	% are men	% are women
Oblast council	83.5	16.5
Oblast City Center council	78.5	21.5
City council	81.5	18.5
Rayon council	73.8	26.2
Town (selyshna) council	74.9	25.1
Village (silkska) council	83.4	16.6

Voting channel

As was mentioned above, if a candidate received more than 25% of the quota, they could move up in the list. In this part of report, we compared a position of a winner in the territorial list before and after elections (such data are available on the website of the Central Election Committee). As Table 8.1 suggests, both men and women were likely to move up in the list due to the number of votes they received. Thus, women were likely to succeed due to their voters' support (and not only due to the quota itself).

Table 8.1. How many candidates moved up the list due to the voting (i.e., they received more than the electoral quota)

	Men winners	Women winners
From the 2d place to the 1st	1,808 (11%)	721 (9%)
From the 3d place to the 2d	600 (4%)	363 (4.5%)
From the 4th place to the 3d	148 (1%)	107 (1.3%)
From the 5th place to the 4th	33 (0.2%)	49 (0.6%)
From the 6th place to the 5th	7 (0.04%)	22 (0.3%)


Structural channels

Gender disbalance in politics is likely to stems from general aspects of gender inequalities and sexism in society. On the one hand, women tend to have lower wages and occupational status in Ukraine³, which makes it more difficult for them to sponsor their campaigns and compete for higher party ranks against more resourceful male candidates. On the other hand, conservative communities are likely to discourage women from political competition due to a challenge to the traditional gender norm of male leadership. In this case, less voters are going to support female candidates.


Previous studies on this matter are mixed. On the one hand, there is plenty of research showing structural gaps in economic opportunities for men and women. On the other hand, studies of gender preferences in politics in Ukraine are scarce. A study of NDI (2016) used experimental design and the implicit associative test (IAT) techniques to address this issue. The study showed that: (1) Ukrainian respondents tend to associate men with politics and women with household tasks; (2) nevertheless, this does not prevent respondents from voting for women. Therefore, the overall effect of gender inequalities and sexism on political competition in local elections is mixed.

Insights from Qualitative interviews


Motivation

	<p>All of the female politicians argued that their motivation to compete in politics was their fundamental desire to change society. In the case of our respondents, most of them were activists engaged in civic projects. However, they were not happy with the lack of progress and impact. Thus, they decided to join politics.</p>
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Party recruitment


	<p>All our respondents admitted that they received propositions from several parties through informal contacts. Moreover, all respondents suggested that the demand for female candidates increased with the quota implementation. Having said this, it was essential for them to choose a party that would not perceive female candidates as tokens. Thus, gender quotas allowed females more leverage and bargaining power. They received several offers and were able to select a more suitable party.</p>
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“The first candidates” channel


	<p>All respondents were aware of this channel. Depending on the party and its structure (more democratic or more hierarchical), the first candidate was appointed either in exchange for the largest donation or for the virtue of being popular and likable among voters.</p> <p>Importantly, no respondent mentioned that this channel was used on purpose to circumvent gender quota. Thus, it is better to treat this channel of inequality as a structural one (together with economic and social background of candidates). Since female politicians are less likely to have enough resources to influence party leadership (e.g., by donations or investing in media campaigns to raise popularity), they are less likely to be invited as first candidates.</p>
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³A Woman In Ukraine: where gender inequality comes from. <https://womenplatform.net/region/a-woman-in-ukraine-where-gender-inequality-comes-from/>; Kupets, O. (2006). Determinants of unemployment duration in Ukraine. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 34(2), 228-247.

Organizational mess

	<p>Considering the process of electoral campaign, all respondents mentioned issues with the implementation of the new electoral code. Parties and the territorial electoral interpreted norms differently. Moreover, local offices were not prepared logistically, they lacked protocols and coordinators were not prepared.</p> <p>This could be one of the reasons why some parties managed to get away with violating quotas.</p>
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Sexism and gender stereotypes

	<p>All respondents acknowledged that voters and parties act on gender stereotypes (leadership is associated with masculinity). However, they disagree that these stereotypes are necessary channeled in sexism and discrimination. Voters and party members could be suspicious to women, but they acknowledge professionalism, skills and experience.</p> <p>All respondents agree that gender quota is a necessary yet temporarily devise that could be less relevant in the future.</p>
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Social characteristics of women-winners

In this part of report, we analyze biographies of all candidates in order to address those social variables which are likely to influence the success of female candidates.

As both Tables 9.1 and Table 9.2 indicate, men and women were quite similar with respect to their social characteristics. Most of winners of both genders had higher education, were employed, they often had higher occupational statuses⁴. As expected, women were slightly less often party members (it is in line with the idea that women were sometimes recruited from elsewhere in order to fill the quota).

Table 9.1. Social characteristics of candidates

	Men candidates	Women candidates
Age		
Below 21	8.4%	9.3%
21-29	27.5%	29.4%
30-39	27.8%	29.9%
40-49	22.6%	21.4%
50-59	11.1%	7.7%
60-69	1.0%	1.6%
70 and more	1.5%	0.7%
Have higher education	78%	78%
Unemployed	0.6%	0.5%
Is private entrepreneur	1.4%	0.9%
Teaching occupation	1.6%	4.5%
Medical occupation	1.6%	3.6%
High occupational status	16.1%	14.1%

⁴ High occupational status was defined as a job title with key words which signal about the managerial or senior occupation (e.g., “manager”, “head”, “lead”, etc.).

No party affiliation	72.1%	75.7%
Was born in a village	60.4%	59.3%
Was born in a town	7.0%	7.4%
Was born in a city	32.6%	33.3%
Lives in the same region (oblast) where is candidate	91.1%	92.0%

Interestingly, women slightly more often have occupations of teachers or doctors.

Table 9.2. Social characteristics of winners

	Men winners	Women winners
Age		
Below 21	4.5%	4.6%
21-29	24.4%	24.0%
30-39	31.9%	33.1%
40-49	26.1%	28.0%
50-59	11.5%	9.4%
60-69	0.2%	0.3%
70 and more	1.3%	0.6%
Have higher education	89%	89%
Unemployed	0.4%	0.2%
Is private entrepreneur	1.3%	0.6%
Teaching occupation	1.0%	3.0%
Medical occupation	1.9%	3.7%
High occupational status	26.3%	23.7%
No party affiliation	62.6%	67.8%
Was born in a village	57.8%	57.1%
Was born in a town	8.2%	9.3%
Was born in a city	34.0%	33.6%
Lives in the same region (oblast) where is candidate	92.8%	94.0%

In order to test whether these variables influence the chance of a candidate to become a winner, we run several respective statistical models for men and women in different councils. These models are described in Appendix in Tables A4 and A5. According to these models, place of birth handicaps women from succeeding in larger urban councils (perhaps due to the lack of resources or networks)

Table 9.3. Summary of the statistical models

	For men	For women
Higher education	Increases chances to become a winner in all councils	Increases chances to become a winner in all councils
Higher age	Increases chances to become a winner in all councils except the Oblast council	Increases chances to become a winner in all councils except the Oblast council and silska council
Higher occupational status	Increases chances to become a winner in all councils	Increases chances to become a winner in all councils

Was born in a village

Increases chances to become a winner
in rural councils

Decreases chances in oblast and city
councils

Party programs

In order to further investigate the connection between political competition and female empowerment, we analyzed 1,958 programs of 6 political parties with the highest female representation (in terms of lists and actual winners). Furthermore, these parties include large national competitors and strong local competitors (e.g., Svoboda in the West and Block Kernesa in the East).

Table 10. 1,958 programs by six major parties.

	Oblast councils	City councils	Rayon councils	Total
European Solidarity	24	313	109	446
Batkivschyna	22	311	108	441
Sluha Narodu (Servant of People)	22	309	109	440
Opposition Platform - Za Zhyttya (For Life)	21	243	90	354
Svoboda	12	137	46	231
Block Kernesa	1	15	7	23




All programs were downloaded from the webpage of the Central Election Committee. Then, we analyzed all programs searching for the most frequent words. It appeared that all parties were homogeneous in their key messages across regions. **There was no regional variation by parties in the way they presented and discussed main political issues.** Moreover, our analysis across types of councils (city, oblast level, rayon level) showed no differences in key messages and most frequent words by parties.

Messages of parties overlapped significantly focusing on the welfare (budget, tariffs, public service), quality of governance (high standards, implementation, governance), and values (comfort, local identities, community service, creativity).

Nevertheless, each party had its own angle on these issues.

- Svoboda and Batkivschyna similarly emphasized the importance of the nation. They transcended local identities and addressed the importance of the Ukrainian state and nation. They also similarly stressed the role of social welfare (the state should provide care to its citizens).
- In contrast, Sluha Narodu was keen to stress change and creativity. This party emphasized education and investment in technologies.
- Opposition Platform and European Solidarity similarly emphasized the importance of quality of local governance, the importance of land, importance of local development. The former was keener on the subject of peace and tariffs.
- Block Kernesa (in contrast to Svoboda) committed to local issues of city comfort, development, and community building.

	European Solidarity: region, city, standard, budget, state, land
	Svoboda: city, nation, social, public, govern, youth
	Batkivschyna: Ukraine, support, team, implement, local, party, provide

	OP-Za zhyttya: budget, land, house, tariff, profession, reduce, transport, peace
	Sluha Narodu: community, quality, new, govern, education, team, service, create, modern, invest
	Block Kernesha: City, community, comfort, success, sport, safe

Considering female empowerment, these parties did not address the issue of gender inequality in their programs. Major parties rather addressed the issue of local economic development and high living standards of all citizens.

New election code of Ukraine Increased **party control** since a deputy now can be recalled by the party. Our analysis indicates that major political parties tend to have homogeneous programs across territories and types of councils. **This context favors the centralized management of the party and makes control easier.** When political programs are essentially the same for all local party offices (despite regional differences of their constituencies), the cost of party control is smaller since there is a single checklist for all party members.

Recommendations:

This report indicates that there is still room of improvement in terms how the gender quota is performed

1. Our qualitative interview showed that local authorities and party members were not fully prepared to the new protocols. There were many disagreements and different interpretations of the norms by local actors. Therefore, more time and effort are needed to educate all stakeholders.

2. Data analysis shows that a significant share of parties neglected gender quotas in their lists. Depending on the type of violation, we counted from half to two-thirds of the parties. Thus, more efforts are necessary to ensure compliance in future local elections.

3. Considering female empowerment, our data indicate that more women were elected to oblast level councils in 2020 compared to 2015. In line with this finding, our qualitative interviews suggest that female candidates acknowledge the quota's positive role and suggest that it should be applied in the future. Thus, we recommend sustaining this quota for future elections.

4. According to our literature review, some experts argue that the threshold for moving ahead the territorial list of 25% should be reduced to 5%. We recommend studying this matter more deeply.

5. Our qualitative interviews and statistical data analysis indicate that socio-economic burdens still hinder females' motivation to attend and succeed in politics. Gender quota cannot succeed alone without greater efforts in reducing socio-economic inequalities in society.

6. Our analysis indicates that the rule of “the first candidate” shapes gender balance in politics. A difference between 78% of male “first candidates” vs. 22% female “first candidates” is striking. At the same time, there is no clear interpretation of this rule in the electoral code. Our qualitative interviews suggest that this rule was not designed to circumvent gender quota. Instead, this rule exists as a device for party promotion. This rule has affected gender composition in a collateral way. Yet, many female politicians are excluded from competition for the first candidate's title due to the lack of resources and social status in society (which is a consequence of structural inequalities). We recommend initiating a discussion of this rule and consider possible options to deal with it (from amendments to cancelation).

Appendix

Distribution of regions by macro-regions.

We follow terminology frequently employed by Ukrainian sociologists and pollsters (<http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=944&page=1>)

West: Volynska, Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Ternopilska, Khmel'nitska, Chernivetska;

Center-North: city of Kyiv, Kyiv oblast, Vinnytska, Zhytomyrska, Kirovohradska, Poltavska, Sumska, Cherkaska, Chernihivska;

South: Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizhska, Mykolaivska, Odeska, Khersonska;

East: Kharkovska, Donetska, Luhanska

Table A1. SINGLE LIST. LARGE COUNCILS.

Parties which violated electoral code in large councils (10,000 voters and more).

Party	N of candidates	N of councils	Violation 1	Violation 2	Total Violations	Viol 1 (share)	Viol 2 (share)
republika	37	1	0	1	1	0,0	100,0
sotsialisty	38	1	0	1	1	0,0	100,0
komanda dnipra	41	1	0	1	1	0,0	100,0
vlada narodu	51	2	1	2	2	50,0	100,0
samovryadna ukrayinska derzhava	51	2	0	1	1	0,0	50,0
sotsialistychna partiya oleksandra moroza	54	2	0	1	1	0,0	50,0
ukrayinska partiya chesti borotby z koruptsiyeyu ta orhanizovanoyu zlochynnistyuu	54	1	1	1	1	100,0	100,0
molodizhna partiya ukrayiny	69	2	0	1	1	0,0	50,0
partiia zakhysnykiv vitchyzny alternatyva	72	3	1	0	1	33,3	0,0
nashi	76	3	1	0	1	33,3	0,0
soyuz livykh syl	85	4	2	0	2	50,0	0,0
ideya natsiyi	89	4	1	0	1	25,0	0,0
bdzhola	91	3	0	1	1	0,0	33,3
partiia vilnykh demokrativ	94	2	0	1	1	0,0	50,0
eko partiia berezy	102	3	0	1	1	0,0	33,3
ukrayinska partiia	109	2	0	1	1	0,0	50,0
narodna partiia	111	4	1	1	2	25,0	25,0
komanda mykhaylishyna	115	4	0	1	1	0,0	25,0
krayina	121	3	0	1	1	0,0	33,3
dobryy samaryanyn	124	6	0	1	1	0,0	16,7
rozumna syla	139	5	1	1	2	20,0	20,0
partiia spravedlyvist	142	5	1	2	2	20,0	40,0
mykolayivtsi	145	6	1	1	2	16,7	16,7
partiia khrystyianskodemokratychnyy soyuz	146	3	1	3	3	33,3	100,0
republikanska platforma	152	6	2	1	2	33,3	16,7
partiia rozvytku hromad	160	7	3	2	4	42,9	28,6
hromada i zakon	162	6	0	1	1	0,0	16,7
ukrayinska pravoslavna asambleya	164	6	2	0	2	33,3	0,0
partiia chernivchan	181	7	0	1	1	0,0	14,3
demokratychna partiia uhortsiv ukrayiny	185	5	1	0	1	20,0	0,0
dukhovna ukrayina	210	8	2	3	4	25,0	37,5
partiia natsionalnoho ehoyizmu	226	8	2	2	3	25,0	25,0
komanda symchyshyna	252	8	3	1	4	37,5	12,5
partiia volodymyra buryaka yednannya	294	9	3	0	3	33,3	0,0
osnova	300	9	2	2	3	22,2	22,2
aktsent	304	12	3	3	5	25,0	25,0
konhres ukrayinskykh natsionalistiv	321	10	1	2	3	10,0	20,0
yedyna alternatyva	336	14	3	3	5	21,4	21,4
partiia veteraniv afhanistanu	356	11	2	2	3	18,2	18,2
novi oblychya	361	12	2	3	4	16,7	25,0
patriot	376	12	0	1	1	0,0	8,3
partiia vinnychan	381	15	1	3	3	6,7	20,0
yevropeyska partiia ukrayiny	397	13	0	2	2	0,0	15,4
liva opozytsiya	408	16	3	1	3	18,8	6,3
ukrayinska narodna partiia	410	17	5	1	5	29,4	5,9
volya	411	15	3	1	3	20,0	6,7
partiia prostykh lyudey serhiya kaplina	442	15	0	2	2	0,0	13,3
blok volodymyra saldo	450	16	1	4	5	6,3	25,0
partiia hromadska syla	472	15	0	1	1	0,0	6,7
partiia mistsevoho samovryaduvannya	493	13	1	1	1	7,7	7,7
pravyy sektor	509	18	7	2	9	38,9	11,1
partiia pensioneriv ukrayiny	517	18	1	4	5	5,6	22,2
	530	19	8	3	10	42,1	15,8

hromadyanskyy rukh khvylyya	626	23	3	2	3	13,0	8,7
nova polityka	644	19	1	1	2	5,3	5,3
poryadok	692	25	6	1	7	24,0	4,0
razom syla	758	28	3	4	7	10,7	14,3
ukrayinska morskya partiya serhiya kivalova	765	30	7	5	10	23,3	16,7
hromadskyy rukh mykoly tomenka ridna krayina	771	25	5	4	7	20,0	16,0
za konkretni spravy	774	25	1	3	4	4,0	12,0
ukrayina slavetna	812	28	1	3	3	3,6	10,7
partiya ihorya kolykhaeva nam tut zhyty!	823	27	3	2	4	11,1	7,4
hromadskyy rukh narodnyy kontrol	859	32	3	5	7	9,4	15,6
vseukrayinske obyednannya cherkashchany	891	31	0	5	5	0,0	16,1
natsionalnyy korpus	900	34	0	2	2	0,0	5,9
ridnyy dim	907	29	1	2	3	3,4	6,9
partiya zelenykh ukrayiny	951	30	9	4	13	30,0	13,3
komanda andriya balohy	1052	36	1	2	3	2,8	5,6
ridne zakarpattya	1089	37	1	2	3	2,7	5,4
doviryay dilam	1310	47	2	11	13	4,3	23,4
partiya shariya	1361	46	2	16	18	4,3	34,8
ridne misto	1470	47	2	7	9	4,3	14,9
blok vilkula	1562	50	1	6	6	2,0	12,0
syla lyudey	1573	55	2	6	8	3,6	10,9
dovira	1734	59	8	8	13	13,6	13,6
opozytynyy blok	1766	64	6	11	14	9,4	17,2
ukr stratehiya hroysmana	1813	60	2	7	9	3,3	11,7
hromadyanska pozytsiya	1953	75	8	10	18	10,7	13,3
ahrama partiya ukrayiny	2457	92	19	15	29	20,7	16,3
ukrayinska halytska partiya	2491	89	7	14	17	7,9	15,7
narodnyy rukh ukrayiny	2977	105	10	21	29	9,5	20,0
peremoha palchevskoho	3230	113	5	11	15	4,4	9,7
holos	5231	194	5	18	23	2,6	9,3
propozytsiya	6272	215	19	24	41	8,8	11,2
syla i chest	9256	338	30	55	78	8,9	16,3
radykalna partiya	9295	355	42	53	81	11,8	14,9
vo svoboda	9838	359	34	44	66	9,5	12,3
nash kray	12572	427	40	52	83	9,4	12,2
europeyska solidaryst	21130	744	22	90	109	3,0	12,1
za maybutnye	21537	741	63	120	167	8,5	16,2
sluha narodu	22852	762	51	147	185	6,7	19,3
vo batkivshchyna	23007	758	64	103	154	8,4	13,6

Table A2. TERRITORIA LIST.

Parties which violated electoral code in large councils (10,000 voters and more)

Party	N of candidates	N of councils	Violation 1	Violation 2	Total Violations	Viol 1 (share)	Viol 2 (share)
partiya za prava lyudyny	20	1	1	0	1	100,0	0,0
patrioty ukrayiny	26	1	1	0	1	100,0	0,0
respublikanska partiya	26	1	0	1	1	0,0	100,0
republika	37	1	0	1	1	0,0	100,0
sotsialisty	38	1	0	1	1	0,0	100,0
komanda dnipra	41	1	0	1	1	0,0	100,0
samovryadna ukrayinska derzhava	51	2	0	1	1	0,0	50,0
molodizhna partiya ukrayiny	69	2	0	1	1	0,0	50,0
berezanska hromada	80	3	1	0	1	33,3	0,0
hromadyansky rukh svidomi	89	3	0	1	1	0,0	33,3
ideya natsiyi	91	3	0	2	2	0,0	66,7
bdzhola	94	2	0	1	1	0,0	50,0
eko partiya berezy	109	2	0	1	1	0,0	50,0
ukrayinska partiya	111	4	1	1	2	25,0	25,0
narodna partiya	115	4	1	1	2	25,0	25,0
komanda mykhaylishyna	121	3	0	1	1	0,0	33,3
ukrayinska respublikanska partiya	134	5	0	1	1	0,0	20,0
dobryy samaryanyn	139	5	1	2	3	20,0	40,0
rozumna syla	142	5	2	1	2	40,0	20,0
partiya spravedlyvist	145	6	0	1	1	0,0	16,7
mykolayivtsi	146	3	0	3	3	0,0	100,0
partiya myru ta rozvytku	153	4	0	1	1	0,0	25,0
blok vadyrna boychenka	160	4	0	1	1	0,0	25,0
respublikanska platforma	160	7	0	1	1	0,0	14,3
partiya rozvytku hromad	162	6	0	2	2	0,0	33,3
hromada i zakon	164	6	0	1	1	0,0	16,7
khersontsi	184	5	0	1	1	0,0	20,0
partiya chernivchan	185	5	2	4	4	40,0	80,0
demokratychna partiya uhortsiv ukrayiny	210	8	1	2	2	12,5	25,0
dukhovna ukrayina	226	8	0	2	2	0,0	25,0
partiya natsionalnoho ehoyizmu	252	8	1	3	3	12,5	37,5
komanda levchenka narodovladdya	258	8	1	0	1	12,5	0,0
komanda symchyshyna	294	9	0	2	2	0,0	22,2
partiya volodymyra buryaka yednannya	300	9	1	2	3	11,1	22,2
demokratychna sokyra	301	9	1	1	2	11,1	11,1
osnova	304	12	2	3	4	16,7	25,0
aktsent	321	10	3	3	5	30,0	30,0
konhres ukrayinskykh natsionalistiv	336	14	1	3	3	7,1	21,4
yedyna alternatyva	356	11	0	2	2	0,0	18,2
partiya veteraniv afhanistanu	361	12	5	7	8	41,7	58,3
novi oblychchya	376	12	0	2	2	0,0	16,7
patriot	381	15	0	2	2	0,0	13,3
partiya vinnychan	397	13	0	1	1	0,0	7,7
yevropeyska partiya ukrayiny	408	16	1	1	2	6,3	6,3
liva opozytsiya	410	17	2	3	4	11,8	17,6
ukrayinska narodna partiya	411	15	1	2	3	6,7	13,3
partiya prostykh lyudey serhiya kaplina	450	16	0	2	2	0,0	12,5
blok volodymyra saldo	472	15	1	4	4	6,7	26,7
partiya hromadska syla	493	13	1	1	2	7,7	7,7
kmks partiya uhortsiv ukrayiny	500	18	0	3	3	0,0	16,7
partiya mistsevoho samovryaduvannya	509	18	1	5	5	5,6	27,8
pravyy sektor	517	18	1	1	2	5,6	5,6
partiya pensioneriv ukrayiny	530	19	2	5	6	10,5	26,3
hromadyansky rukh khvylya	626	23	1	5	5	4,3	21,7

nova polityka	644	19	1	3	4	5,3	15,8
poryadok	692	25	1	0	1	4,0	0,0
razom syla	758	28	1	4	5	3,6	14,3
ukrayinska morská partiya serhiya kivalova	765	30	1	2	3	3,3	6,7
hromadskyy rukh mykoly tomenka ridna krayina	771	25	2	7	7	8,0	28,0
za konkretni spravy	774	25	0	4	4	0,0	16,0
ukrayina slavetna	812	28	1	4	4	3,6	14,3
partiya ihorya kolykhaieva nam tut zhyty!	823	27	1	2	2	3,7	7,4
hromadskyy rukh narodnyy kontrol	859	32	3	9	9	9,4	28,1
vseukrayinske obyednannya cherkashchany	891	31	0	6	6	0,0	19,4
natsionalnyy korpus	900	34	1	1	2	2,9	2,9
ridnyy dim	907	29	1	2	3	3,4	6,9
partiya zelenykh ukrayiny	951	30	4	6	8	13,3	20,0
komanda andriya balohy	1052	36	1	3	4	2,8	8,3
ridne zakarpattya	1089	37	1	7	7	2,7	18,9
doviryay dilam	1310	47	1	8	9	2,1	17,0
partiya shariya	1361	46	2	15	17	4,3	32,6
ridne misto	1470	47	3	9	10	6,4	19,1
blok vilkula ukrayinska perspektyva	1562	50	0	8	8	0,0	16,0
syla lyudey	1573	55	1	3	4	1,8	5,5
dovira	1734	59	4	14	15	6,8	23,7
opozytynyy blok	1766	64	6	14	19	9,4	21,9
ukr stratehiya hroysmana	1813	60	0	5	5	0,0	8,3
hromadyanska pozytsiya	1953	75	4	13	15	5,3	17,3
aharna partiya ukrayiny	2457	92	3	14	16	3,3	15,2
ukrayinska halytska partiya	2491	89	3	10	13	3,4	11,2
narodnyy rukh ukrayiny	2977	105	13	27	34	12,4	25,7
peremoha palchevskoho	3230	113	6	18	21	5,3	15,9
holos	5231	194	7	20	25	3,6	10,3
propozytsiya	6272	215	11	28	35	5,1	13,0
syla i chest	9256	338	17	64	73	5,0	18,9
radykalna partiya	9295	355	24	66	80	6,8	18,6
vo svoboda	9838	359	18	54	65	5,0	15,0
nash kray	12572	427	18	86	94	4,2	20,1
europeyska solidarist	21130	744	20	118	130	2,7	15,9
za maybutnye	21537	741	28	153	166	3,8	20,6
sluha narodu	22852	762	22	171	180	2,9	22,4
vo batkivshchyna	23007	758	43	209	224	5,7	27,6

Table A3. SMALL COUNCILS

Parties which violated electoral code in small councils (<10,000 voters).

Party	N of candidates	N of councils	Violation	Violation share
aktsent	1	1	1	100,0
narod	1	1	1	100,0
narodna partiya	1	1	1	100,0
hromadyan skyy rukh khvylyya	2	2	1	50,0
partiya shariya	2	1	1	100,0
razom syla	2	2	1	50,0
komanda symchyshyna	3	2	1	50,0
ukrayin ska narodna partiya	3	3	3	100,0
varta (vseukrayin skyy alyans rehionalnykh i terytorialnykh aktyvistiv)	5	2	1	50,0
hromada i zakon	5	1	1	100,0
partiya vinnychan	5	1	1	100,0
respublikan ska platforma	6	1	1	100,0
partiya mistsevoho samovryaduvannya	9	3	1	33,3
blok volodymyra saldo	10	2	1	50,0
yedyna alternatyva	10	5	1	20,0
demokratychna partiya uhortsiv ukrayiny	11	4	2	50,0
ob"yednannya samopomich	16	4	1	25,0
partiya volodymyra buryaka yednannya	21	3	1	33,3
blok vilkula ukrayin ska perspektyva	28	6	1	16,7
poryadok	29	7	2	28,6
natsionalnyy korpus	30	5	1	20,0
narodnyy rukh ukrayiny	34	10	4	40,0
osnova	41	4	1	25,0
ukrayina slavetna	51	12	3	25,0
udar	79	15	6	40,0
hromad skyy rukh narodnyy kontrol	85	18	1	5,6
holos	90	28	9	32,1
komanda serhiya rudyka. chas zmin!	96	14	1	7,1
peremoha palchev skoho	104	24	7	29,2
partiya ihorya kolykhaiyeva nam tut zhyty!	124	13	1	7,7
aharna partiya ukrayiny	193	39	12	30,8
ukrayin ska halyt ska partiya	210	42	5	11,9
vseukrayin ske ob'yednannya platforma hromad	238	28	1	3,6
ridne misto	250	25	3	12,0
ukrayin ska stratehiya hroysmana	263	17	1	5,9
doviryay dilam	291	35	2	5,7
ridne zakarpattya	320	28	4	14,3
komanda andriya balohy	356	25	3	12,0
vseukrayin ske obyednannya cherkashchany	362	30	4	13,3
propozytsiya	398	69	16	23,2
vseukrayin ske obyednannya svoboda	529	107	27	25,2
radykalna partiya oleha lyashka	584	155	39	25,2
syla i chest	629	120	24	20,0
yevropey ska solidarnist	2055	308	51	16,6
opozytziyna platforma – za zhyttya	2602	308	38	12,3
nash kray	2702	249	24	9,6
za maybutnye	5653	589	68	11,5
vo batkivshchyna	6234	658	55	8,4
sluha narodu	7293	601	42	7,0

Table A4. Logistic regression predicting a winner (men)

Women	Dependent variable: winner					
	winners_numeric					
	Oblast	Oblast center	City	Rayon	Town (selyshe)	Village (silka)
Have higher education	1.695*** (0.360)	1.326*** (0.325)	1.052*** (0.062)	0.795*** (0.091)	0.990*** (0.072)	0.628*** (0.108)
22-29	13.622 (354.031)	1.638 (1.021)	0.612 (0.392)	0.597 (0.397)	0.620 (0.599)	-0.466 (0.558)
30-39	14.356 (354.031)	1.914* (1.010)	1.179*** (0.382)	0.581 (0.389)	1.459** (0.584)	0.407 (0.522)
40-49	14.371 (354.031)	2.255** (1.010)	1.551*** (0.382)	0.775** (0.389)	1.943*** (0.583)	0.734 (0.521)
50-59	14.310 (354.031)	2.151** (1.015)	1.817*** (0.382)	0.986** (0.389)	2.052*** (0.584)	1.007* (0.522)
60-69	14.287 (354.031)	2.176** (1.028)	1.803*** (0.385)	0.905** (0.395)	1.958*** (0.588)	0.997* (0.534)
More than 70	14.681 (354.031)	1.661 (1.237)	1.448*** (0.446)	-0.029 (0.598)	2.144*** (0.650)	0.633 (0.738)
Unemployed	-14.600 (667.830)	-10.596 (214.675)	-0.548 (0.417)	0.051 (0.603)	-0.635 (0.389)	-1.555 (1.012)
Entrepreneur	-0.222 (0.425)	-1.136 (1.012)	-0.155 (0.222)	0.069 (0.318)	-0.738* (0.390)	-1.083 (1.023)
High occupational status	0.484*** (0.114)	0.707*** (0.128)	0.552*** (0.047)	0.549*** (0.058)	0.484*** (0.063)	0.518*** (0.118)
Teaching occupation	-0.417 (0.329)	-0.676 (0.420)	-0.650*** (0.109)	-0.629*** (0.153)	-0.531*** (0.130)	-0.691*** (0.239)
Medical occupation	-0.023 (0.265)	-0.493 (0.391)	0.115 (0.099)	0.008 (0.132)	0.056 (0.135)	-0.011 (0.233)
Place of birth - town	-0.057 (0.196)	-0.668 (0.420)	0.209** (0.100)	-0.046 (0.101)	0.207*** (0.068)	-0.375 (0.336)
Place of birth - village	-0.355*** (0.126)	-0.298* (0.165)	-0.097** (0.043)	0.016 (0.055)	-0.006 (0.059)	0.391*** (0.089)
Live same oblast	-0.237 (0.146)	0.229** (0.116)	0.224** (0.110)	0.341*** (0.109)	0.149 (0.151)	0.212 (0.180)
Constant	-18.386 (354.031)	-6.415*** (1.036)	-5.167*** (0.395)	-4.222*** (0.400)	-5.021*** (0.599)	-3.692*** (0.547)
Observations	7,021	7,392	41,732	20,307	18,403	5,967
Log Likelihood	-1,588.664	-1,391.893	-10,313.700	-5,891.818	-5,578.474	-1,879.352
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,209.327	2,815.785	20,659.400	11,815.640	11,188.950	3,790.704
Note:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01			

Table A5. Logistic regression predicting a winner (women)

Women	Dependent variable: winner					
	winners_numeric					
	Oblast	Oblast center	City	Rayon	Town (selyshe)	Village (silka)
Have higher education	1.695*** (0.360)	1.326*** (0.325)	1.052*** (0.062)	0.795*** (0.091)	0.990*** (0.072)	0.628*** (0.108)
22-29	13.622 (354.031)	1.638 (1.021)	0.612 (0.392)	0.597 (0.397)	0.620 (0.599)	-0.466 (0.558)
30-39	14.356 (354.031)	1.914* (1.010)	1.179*** (0.382)	0.581 (0.389)	1.459** (0.584)	0.407 (0.522)
40-49	14.371 (354.031)	2.255** (1.010)	1.551*** (0.382)	0.775** (0.389)	1.943*** (0.583)	0.734 (0.521)
50-59	14.310 (354.031)	2.151** (1.015)	1.817*** (0.382)	0.986** (0.389)	2.052*** (0.584)	1.007* (0.522)
60-69	14.287 (354.031)	2.176** (1.028)	1.803*** (0.385)	0.905** (0.395)	1.958*** (0.588)	0.997* (0.534)
More than 70	14.681 (354.031)	1.661 (1.237)	1.448*** (0.446)	-0.029 (0.598)	2.144*** (0.650)	0.633 (0.738)
Unemployed	-14.600 (667.830)	-10.596 (214.675)	-0.548 (0.417)	0.051 (0.603)	-0.635 (0.389)	-1.555 (1.012)
Entrepreneur	-0.222 (0.425)	-1.136 (1.012)	-0.155 (0.222)	0.069 (0.318)	-0.738* (0.390)	-1.083 (1.023)
High occupational status	0.484*** (0.114)	0.707*** (0.128)	0.552*** (0.047)	0.549*** (0.058)	0.484*** (0.063)	0.518*** (0.118)
Teaching occupation	-0.417 (0.329)	-0.676 (0.420)	-0.650*** (0.109)	-0.629*** (0.153)	-0.531*** (0.130)	-0.691*** (0.239)
Medical occupation	-0.023 (0.265)	-0.493 (0.391)	0.115 (0.099)	0.008 (0.132)	0.056 (0.135)	-0.011 (0.233)
Place of birth - town	-0.057 (0.196)	-0.668 (0.420)	0.209** (0.100)	-0.046 (0.101)	0.207*** (0.068)	-0.375 (0.336)
Place of birth - village	-0.355*** (0.126)	-0.298* (0.165)	-0.097** (0.043)	0.016 (0.055)	-0.006 (0.059)	0.391*** (0.089)
Live same oblast	-0.237 (0.146)	0.229** (0.116)	0.224** (0.110)	0.341*** (0.109)	0.149 (0.151)	0.212 (0.180)
Constant	-18.386 (354.031)	-6.415*** (1.036)	-5.167*** (0.395)	-4.222*** (0.400)	-5.021*** (0.599)	-3.692*** (0.547)
Observations	7,021	7,392	41,732	20,307	18,403	5,967
Log Likelihood	-1,588.664	-1,391.893	-10,313.700	-5,891.818	-5,578.474	-1,879.352
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,209.327	2,815.785	20,659.400	11,815.640	11,188.950	3,790.704
Note:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01			

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